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Social scientists have long speculated about the extent of agents' rationality, espe-
cially in the context of voting. However, existing attempts at classifying voters as
(ir)rational have been hampered by the fact that preference orderings and, thus,
optimal strategies are generally unobserved. Exploiting the incentive structure of
Germany's electoral system, this paper develops a novel set of empirical tests in or-
der to pit the canonical rational choice model against behavioral theories according
to which voters simply choose their most preferred candidate. The results indicate
that neither approach can rationalize the most-salient features of the data. The
ndings are consistent, however, with a simple hybrid model in which boundedly
rational agents suer a small psychic cost from acting strategically.
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1. Introduction
Rational choice theory is, without question, the dominant paradigm in economics and much
of political science. Even issues once thought to be far beyond the realm of traditional
economics have long been analyzed through the lens of rational choice (see, e.g., Becker
1993). At the same time, a large behavioral literature suggests that agents face cognitive
constraints, and that deviations from strict, unbounded rationality may matter for many
real-world outcomes (Simon 1955, 1972; see also the surveys by Conlisk 1996; Camerer 2006;
and DellaVigna 2009). If economics is to be a positive science of actual human behavior|as
opposed to a normative one of how people should behave|then understanding how prevalent
these deviations are is a matter of rst-order importance.
An area of economics within which scholars have long been interested in this question is
social choice (e.g., Black 1948; Downs 1957; Duverger 1954; Farquharson 1969; Sen 1970).
On the one hand, practically every reasonable electoral system fails to be strategy-proof,
and voters are known to have a systematic incentive to misrepresent their true preferences in
order to aect the outcome of an election (Arrow 1951; Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975).
On the other hand, pivot probabilities in large elections are often vanishingly small. If voters
suer even a small cost from abandoning their favorite candidate or from determining their
optimal strategy, then one may not expect any of them to act strategically (Downs 1957;
Green and Shapiro 1994; Sen 1970).
Given the theoretical merits of both arguments, it may not be surprising that there exists
no consensus on how voters actually behave. Some model voters as strategic, unboundedly
rational individuals seeking to aect electoral outcomes (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1988;
Besley and Coate 1997; Bouton 2013; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1996). Others, however, cast
voters as behavioral agents who navely choose their most preferred candidate, irrespective
of her chances of winning (e.g., Callander 2005; Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Palfrey 1984).
As practically all formal theories in which agents face more than two alternatives require an
assumption about the rationality of individuals, and given that the conclusions from nearly
identical models may depend critically on whether voters are taken to be strategic or sincere
(compare, for instance, Besley and Coate 1997 with Osborne and Slivinski 1996), it is crucial
to close this gap in knowledge. More generally, studying voter behavior in large elections with
(arguably) weak electoral incentives helps to understand to what extent agents act \as if"
they are unboundedly rational.
Of course, how people actually behave is ultimately an empirical question. Yet, outside
of the laboratory it has proven extremely dicult to estimate the extent of instrumentally
rational voting. The key problem is that individuals' true tastes are generally unobserved.
Without imposing further assumptions, it is, therefore, impossible to know whether ballots
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deviate from the underlying preference orderings. In fact, in an important paper, Degan and
Merlo (2009) prove that any cross section of votes can be explained by some utility function,
without resorting to strategic behavior.
To illustrate the problem, consider the 2000 presidential election in Florida, in which
George W. Bush beat out Al Gore by a margin of 537 votes, and as a result, won the
U.S. presidency. Although Florida was widely expected to be a swing state, more than
138,000 voters chose third-party candidates. Viewed through the lens of the canonical rational
choice model, these 138,000 voters could not have behaved strategically, as doing so would
have required them to abandon their favorite candidate and vote for either Bush or Gore.
Unfortunately, all one can infer from data like these is that at least 138,000 out of almost
6 million voters did not behave in accordance with standard theory.1 In order to derive
more meaningful results, one would ideally like to know how many voters actually prefered
a third-party candidate, whom they should have abandoned in favor of Bush or Gore. With
this information in hand, it would be straightforward to determine whether the observed
number of \mistakes" is economically large or small.
Given the prominence of the pivotal voter model, i.e. the assumption of cognitively uncon-
strained actors attempting to aect the outcome of an election, this paper's primary goal
is to quantify deviations from this baseline. As a matter of terminology, agents are said to
be not instrumentally rational if they fail to abandon a candidate who has no chance of
winning.
In order to circumvent the fundamental identication problem, the present paper exploits
the incentive structure of parliamentary elections in Germany. Under the German system,
individuals have two votes. Both are submitted simultaneously and are used to elect rep-
resentatives to the same chamber of parliament. Critically, they are associated with very
dierent incentives. The list vote is cast for a party and counted at the national level. Up to
a rst-order approximation, list votes determine the distribution of seats in the Bundestag.
Since mandates are awarded on a proportional basis (conditional on clearing a 5%-threshold),
it is in most agents' best interest to reveal their (induced) preferences over which party they
wish to gain the marginal seat by voting for said party.2
By contrast, the candidate vote is counted in a rst-past-the-post system at the district
level. Whichever candidate wins the plurality of votes in a given district is automatically
1Kawai and Watanabe (2013) call this \misaligned voting." Clearly, the set of agents who cast misaligned
votes is only a (potentially small) subset of strategic voters, i.e. those who would abandon their preferred
candidate if need be.
2Note that individuals' preferences over which party wins the marginal seat in parliament need not coincide
with their deep ideological convictions. Nevertheless, it is useful to think of preferences in this narrowly
dened way, as it conditions on expectations about post-election coalition formation, beliefs about the
behavior of other voters, the inuence of campaign activities, etc.
2
elected. Votes cast for any other contestant are \lost." Although the candidate vote is pri-
marily used to determine the identity of local representatives, by securing a disproportionate
share of districts parties may actually increase their seat totals (see Section 2 for details).
The important point is that when it comes to choosing among dierent candidates, voters
have a clear incentive to behave tactically. As in all elections under plurality rule, agents
who act in accordance with standard rational choice theory should never vote for a party's
nominee if she is known to be \out of the race." Only by choosing one of the candidates who
remain in contention for victory can voters hope to aect the outcome of the race.
Under the assumption that voters are not exactly indierent about who carries their home
district, it is possible to shed light on whether individual choices are consistent with leading
theories of how voters behave. To see why the German context is helpful, consider an agent
who cast his party vote for the small, libertarian FDP. Although the FDP elds candidates
in practically all district-level races, they are almost never in contention for victory. Thus,
as long as this voter knows that the FDP candidate in his district is \out of the race," he
should not vote for her. Doing so would be inconsistent with instrumental rationality. Instead,
conditional on supporting the FDP, he should split his ticket and vote for the candidate of
another party|one who actually is in contention for victory.
While it is tempting to think of the list vote as a proxy for agents' preferences over
parties and the associated candidates|especially if one believes that voters do not have
strong incentives to behave strategically under proportional representation|it is important
to emphasize at the outset that such an assumption is not required for testing rational
choice theory. Voting for a candidate who is known to be \out of the race" is inconsistent
with instrumental rationality, irrespective of why a given individual chose to support the
associated party.
Hence, instead of asking the dicult question of what fraction of voters sticks with their
preferred candidate despite her having no chance of winning, the German electoral system
allows us to tackle a much simpler one: Conditional on having a strategic incentive to split
their ballot, how many voters fail to do so? That is, how many of a party's supporters simply
vote for the associated candidate despite her being \out of the race?"3
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the answer turns out to be \most." Restricting attention to
candidates who trailed the runner-up by more than 10 percentage points, the gure displays
a semiparametric estimate of the relationship between precinct-level vote shares of a candi-
date's party and the candidate herself. If individuals behaved as prescribed by the standard
3It is important to note that the usual reasoning for split-ticket votes, as in Alesina and Rosenthal (1996),
does not apply in the context of Germany. After all, politicians elected via the candidate vote enter the
same chamber of parliament as their colleagues elected via the list vote. Thus, voters seeking to balance the
legislature should (except in knife-edge cases) choose the same party with both votes.
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pivotal voter model and were not \irrationally" optimistic about these candidates' chances of
being in contention for victory, then none of them should have gotten any votes, irrespective
of how popular the party happened to be in a particular precinct. The data resoundingly
reject this prediction. In fact, the slope estimate indicates that more than 60% of party
supporters stick with candidates who are \out of the race."
This and all other ndings are based on previously unavailable, ocial precinct-level data
from the 2005 and 2009 federal elections. In Germany, precincts are the smallest administra-
tive units at which votes are counted, and each precinct is fully contained within one electoral
district. Since races take place at the district level, these data allow for the use of within-
candidate variation only, thereby conditioning on the characteristics of candidates and their
competitors, pivot probabilities, and various other sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
The results in this paper speak directly to large theoretical literatures on tactical voting
(e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Bouton 2013; Cox 1994; Feddersen and Pesendorfer
1996; Myatt 2007; Myerson 2002; Myerson and Weber 1993) and strategyproofness in social
choice (see Barbera 2011 for a recent review). On a purely descriptive level, the empirical
evidence indicates that the fundamental assumption in rational choice studies of voting fails
for the vast majority of individuals.
At the same time, behavioral theories according to which voters sincerely choose their
most preferred candidate are also at odds with the data. Instead of simply positing that the
35% of voters who cast split tickets when it is optimal to do so are acting strategically, the
German context allows for an explicit test of sincere voting. The intuition for this test is,
again, quite simple. Under the null hypothesis of sincere behavior, an agents' list vote must
reveal his true party preference. If preferences over parties and candidates are suciently
correlated, then list and candidate vote shares should track each other almost one for one.
After controlling for candidate quality, this turns out to be the case in situations in which
voters have no incentive to cast split ballots, but not when strategically splitting one's ballot
would be instrumentally rational. In total, the data are inconsistent with sincere behavior
for about one in ten voters.
In sum, both the canonical rational choice model as well as the leading alternative are re-
jected. The evidence is consistent, however, with a simple hybrid model in which agents are
boundedly rational in the sense that they face a heterogenous cost of behaving strategically.
Such \psychic" costs could, for instance, stem from a preference for consistency across do-
mains, social image, true cognitive limitations, or any other impediment to making optimal
choices.4
4DellaVigna et al. (2013), for instance, argue that social image plays an important role in explaining
turnout. That is, individuals vote because they derive pride from telling others that they went to the polls.
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Support for the assertion that agents act \as if" they are boundedly rational comes from
several key pieces of evidence. First, not only do individuals who cast split tickets substitute
toward the nominee of a potential coalition partner, but the tendency to abandon candidates
who are \out of the race" is higher among voters faced with at least one palatable alternative
than among those who can only choose between two evils. Second, voters' choices are less
likely to violate instrumental rationality in elections perceived as \critical" than in ordinary
ones. Lastly, ancillary results show that individuals' sophistication varies systematically with
observational characteristics, such as socioeconomic status and experience with the electoral
system. That is, poor, inexperienced agents are less likely to behave in accordance with the
canonical rational choice model than their wealthy and more experienced counterparts.
The latter ndings contribute to a nascent literature on \who is behavioral." Benjamin
et al. (2013), for instance, show that preference anomalies are related to cognitive skills,
and Choi et al. (2014) demonstrate that decision-making ability in laboratory experiments
correlates strongly with socio-economic status and wealth. That is, wealther individuals
violate the axioms of rationality less frequently than poorer ones.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a more detailed
description of Germany's electoral system and explains how to detect deviations from in-
strumental rationality. Section 3 provides a rst look at the data, while the main results
appear in Section 4. Section 5 studies how the share of behavioral agents varies with voters'
observational characteristics. The penultimate section places the results in the context of the
relevant literature, and the last section concludes.5
2. Germany's Electoral System
2.1. Political Landscape and Electoral Rules
The political landscape in Germany has traditionally been dominated by ve major parties:
CDU/CSU (conservative), SPD (center-left), FDP (libertarian), Green Party (green/left-of-
center), and The Left (far left). Among these, the CDU/CSU and the SPD each have nearly as
many supporters as the three smaller parties combined. Neither party, however, can govern on
the federal level without a coalition partner. Since the mid-1980s, the CDU/CSU's traditional
partner has been the FDP, whereas the SPD, whenever possible, entered into coalitions with
the Green Party. These \preferences" are well-known to voters.
5There are ve appendices available on the author's website. Appendix A explains the algorithm for
calculating each party's number of seats in the Bundestag, while Appendix B provides a partial test of
sincere voting in the proportionality-rule part of the German system. Precise denitions of all variables
used throughout the analysis appear in Appendix C. Lastly, Appendix D replicates the main results using
a structural model of voting decisions with Appendix E elaborating on the numerical methods used in the
structural analysis.
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In order to shed light on the prevalence of deviations from instrumental rationality, the
present paper exploits the incentive structure of elections to the Bundestag, the lower house
of the German legislature. Elections are held every four years according to a mixed-member
system with approximately proportional representation. Except for minor modications, the
same system has been in place since 1953.6
As mentioned in the introduction, each voter casts two dierent votes. The rst vote,
or candidate vote (Erststimme), is used to elect a constituency representative in each of
299 single-member districts. District representatives are determined in a rst-past-the-post
system. That is, whichever contestant achieves the plurality of candidate votes in a given
district is automatically awarded a seat in the Bundestag. Winners are said to hold direct
mandates, and votes cast for any other candidate are discarded.7
The arguably more important vote, however, is the list vote (Zweitstimme). It is cast for
a party list, and the total number of party members who enter the Bundestag is roughly
proportional to a party's share of the national list vote among parties clearing a 5%-threshold.
To achieve approximately proportional representation despite potentially lopsided outcomes
in the candidate vote, the German electoral system awards list mandates. First, all list votes
are aggregated up to the national level, and a total of 598 preliminary seats are distributed
to parties on a proportional basis. Each party's allotment is then broken down to the state
level and compared to its number of direct mandates in the same state. Whichever number
is greater determines how many seats the party will actually receive.
More formally, let dp;s denote the number of districts that party p won in state s, and
let lp;s be how many mandates it would have received in the same state under proportional
representation. Then, the nal number of seats that p retains in s equals
np;s = max fdp;s; lp;sg ;
and its total in the Bundestag is given by np =
P
s np;s (see Appendix A for a detailed,
algorithmic description).
If dp;s < lp;s, then, in addition to the district winners, the rst lp;s   dp;s candidates on
p's list are elected as well. Otherwise, only holders of direct mandates receive a seat. Parties
are said to win overhang mandates (Uberhangmandate) whenever dp;s > lp;s. In such cases
the total number of seats in the Bundestag increases beyond 598. Since the total number of
6In describing the German electoral system this section borrows from Spenkuch (2014).
7Appendix Figure A.1 shows the party aliation of all district winners in the 2005 and 2009 elections.
Although the CDU/CSU secured the majority of direct mandates in both years, there remains ample geo-
graphic variation, as well as some variation over time. Of the ve major parties, only the FDP did not win
any districts|despite gaining a nontrivial fraction of votes. Since the introduction of the two-ballot system
in 1953, no independent candidate has ever won a district.
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s dp;s, by a factor of two, situations in which dp;s > lp;s are not as common as
one might expect. For instance, relative to its share of the list vote, the CDU/CSU received
an additional 7 mandates in 2005, whereas the SPD secured 9 extra seats. In 2009, there
were 24 overhang mandates, 21 of which accrued to the CDU.
It is also important to point out that a party can eld only one direct candidate per district
and that all of Germany's ve major parties do so in almost every district. Candidates can
run in only one district, but the vast majority of them also appear on the respective party's
list in the same state|often in prominent positions. By law, no one is allowed to appear on
multiple parties' lists or on lists in dierent states.
2.2. Detecting Deviations from Instrumental Rationality
Although the list vote is more important in practice, for the purposes of this paper the incen-
tives associated with the candidate vote are what matters the most. As in all elections under
plurality rule, if a particular candidate is known to be \out of the race," then instrumentally
rational agents can always do better by voting for somebody else.
To see this, note that a single vote matters only if it is pivotal, i.e. if (at least) two
candidates are running neck-and-neck ahead of all others. In large elections, such a tie is
orders of magnitudes more likely to involve contestants believed to be front-runners than an
underdog (cf. Myerson 2000). Thus, only a subset of candidates can be serious contenders, and
instrumentally rational voters behave as if they are restricting their choice set to contestants
who are \in the race." This is because, by denition, instrumentally rational agents seek to
aect the outcome of the election, and voting for anybody but a serious contender would be
akin to \wasting" one's vote.
Of course, this argument assumes that voters are not exactly indierent to who carries their
home district. A small preference for one candidate over another, however, seems reasonable,
as who wins a particular district can aect the aggregate distribution of seats. But even if
voters were to take the distribution of seats as given, they likely still care about sending
\good" local representatives to parliament, i.e. ones who are more closely aligned with their
own political views. Such considerations may be especially important because representatives
elected via the candidate vote are much more likely to become members of committees that
allow them to serve their geographically based constituency (see Stratmann and Baur 2002).
In fact, in the 2009 German Longitudinal Election Survey (GLES), almost three out of four
respondents said that it is either \important" or \very important" that candidates represent
the interests of their home districts. Lastly, by voting for one of the front-runners, agents can
determine whether a particular party's direct candidate or the marginal candidate on the
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same party's list in the same state enters parliament. Although expected payos are unlikely
to be very large, the important point is that as long as instrumentally rational voters are
not exactly indierent to who wins their district, they should never waste their vote on a
candidate who is \out of the race."
Since exact indierence is a nongeneric case, the German system allows for a straightfor-
ward way of identifying individuals who do not behave in accordance with standard rational
choice theory. As stated in the introduction, quantifying deviations from the canonical piv-
otal voter model amounts to inferring the share of individuals who stick with a candidate
who is \out of the race," conditional on voting for the associated party. Simply put, agents
who|for whatever reason|cast their list vote for a party whose direct candidate is not
in contention for victory violate instrumental rationality if they also choose the respective
candidate.
The converse, of course, does not hold. That is, individuals who do cast split tickets may,
but need not necessarily, be strategic. For instance, some may desert a particular party's
candidate not because she is \out of the race," but simply because they dislike her. Thus,
without imposing further assumptions, the empirical strategy outlined above will recover a
lower bound on the extent to which agents' observed actions contradict the predictions of
standard theory.
Naturally, estimating a lower bound leaves open the possibility that voters do not behave
strategically at all. In order to rule out sincere voting, the next section constructs a simple
empirical test.
3. A First Look at the Data
3.1. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Before doing so, however, it is useful to get a sense of the broad patterns in the data.
Table 1 shows aggregate frequencies of dierent list and candidate vote combinations in
the 2009 federal election.8 First and foremost, the evidence suggests that some, but not
all, voters desert weak candidates. Although nominees of FDP, Greens, and other minor
parties are rarely in contention for victory, they are abandoned by only about half of their
followers. At the same time, the numbers show that, conditional on abandoning their own
party's candidate, about 83% of all FDP supporters voted for a contestant of the CDU|
its coalition partner|whereas 72% of Green Party adherents chose an SPD nominee. It,
therefore, appears that voters who do desert noncontenders substitute toward close political
8Table 1 is based on a 3.9% random sample of actual votes. German electoral law requires the Federal
Returning Ocer to publish descriptive statistics on vote combinations, as well as voting behavior by age
and gender (see Bundeswahlleiter 2010). Unfortunately, the micro data are not publicly accessible.
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allies.
Although Table 1 is suggestive of some voters behaving strategically, with others likely
being sincere, it is ultimately insucient to quantify the prevalence of either type of behavior.
Again, some FDP supporters might have chosen CDU candidates not because of tactical
considerations, but because they are better qualied or more charismatic. Also, not all CDU
and SPD adherents voted for their own party's nominee. In fact, almost one-third of those
who deviate end up picking a political rival. While it is possible that these voters chose
among the lesser of two evils in districts in which the CDU or the SPD candidate happened
to be \out of the race," it is also plausible that their voting decisions were based on candidate
idiosyncrasies.
In fact, the descriptive statistics in Table 2A demonstrate that candidates dier along
several dimensions.9 For instance, only 19% of CDU candidates are female, compared with
35% of Social Democrats and 34% of Green Party nominees. 95% of SPD candidates are also
on the party list, compared with 43% of their colleagues from The Left. Moreover, relative
to their FDP, Left, or Green Party counterparts, CDU and SPD contestants are about four
times more likely to be a current member of parliament and more than forty times as likely
to be an incumbent. Therefore, any argument linking dierences in the distribution of list
and candidate votes to (ir)rational behavior must be based on an econometric strategy that
carefully controls for candidates' idiosyncratic appeal.
To this end, the present paper relies on ocial results of the 2005 and 2009 federal elec-
tions, by polling precinct (Wahlbezirk).10 These data have been obtained from the Federal
Returning Ocer and were until recently not publicly available. In Germany, precincts are
the smallest administrative units in which votes are counted. Each precinct is fully contained
within an electoral district and associated with one polling station where a returning o-
cer oversees the election. By law, no precinct can contain more than 2,500 eligible voters.
As of 2009, there were 299 electoral districts and almost 89,000 precincts. Since races take
place at the level of the electoral district, precinct-level data allow for all estimates to be
based on within-candidate variation only, thereby conditioning on all observable as well as
unobservable characteristics of candidates and their competitors, the marginal candidates on
parties' lists, pivot probabilities, and many other sources of unobserved heterogeneity across
9The information in Table 2A has been compiled from ocial publications by the Federal Returning Ocer
(Bundeswahlleiter 2005c, 2009b).
10It is useful to restrict attention to 2005 and 2009, as in these years, all important parties were widely
expected to clear the 5%-threshold. For instance, more than 90% of adults sampled in the 2009 pre-election
survey of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) expected the FDP and Green Party to receive
more than ve percent of the list vote. It is, therefore, not necessary to assume that all supporters of, say,
the Green Party are inevitably sincere whenever their party fails to clear the 5%-threshold. Especially in a
world with aggregate uncertainty, such an assumption seems undesirable.
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candidates and districts.
Dierentiating between East and West Germany as well as election year, Table 2B dis-
plays summary statistics for all precinct-level variables. Compared with the U.S., turnout is
fairly high. Averaging across 2005 and 2009, almost 75% of the electorate went to the polls.
Together with an average size of 821 eligible voters, this means that precincts handle about
615 votes. As is well-known, CDU, SPD, FDP, and the Green Party fare substantially better
in West Germany than in the East. The opposite is true for The Left. Moreover, CDU and
SPD receive more candidate than list votes. Given that the nominees of these two parties
are serious contenders in most districts, this could, but need not, be due to strategic voting.
3.2. Testing the Null Hypothesis of Sincere Voting
Following the argument in the introduction, it is straightforward to test the null hypothesis
that voters are \behavioral" in the sense that they fail to internalize the electoral incentives.
If, as in a substantial part of the theoretical literature, all individuals simply choose their
most preferred option|meaning that they cast sincere list and sincere candidate votes|and
if preferences over parties are suciently correlated with that over candidates, then, after
carefully controlling for nominees' idiosyncratic appeal, it should be the case that list and
candidate vote shares track each other almost one for one. That is, under the null hypothesis
of sincere voting, an extra list vote should translate into an additional vote for the nominee
of the respective party.
The results in the upper panel of Table 3 show that this is not the case. The ordinary least
squares estimates therein correspond to the econometric model
(1) vCk;r;t = m;k;t + v
L
k;r;t + k;r;t;
where vCk;r;t denotes contestant k's share of the candidate vote in precinct r during election
year t, and vLk;r;t is her party's share of the list vote in the same precinct. To allow for ar-
bitrary forms of autocorrelation in the residuals as well as for correlation within and across
districts, standard errors are clustered by state.11 Going from the left of the table to the
right, the set of xed eects grows steadily. The most inclusive specication contains m;k;t,
a municipality- and year-specic candidate xed eect. It, therefore, controls nonparametri-
cally for the appeal of individual candidates (and that of their competitors) as perceived by
the voters in a given town or village.12
11Note that there are only 16 states in Germany, which raises issues associated with a small number of
clusters. In order to account for this issue when testing hypotheses, the reported p-values are based on the
wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron et al. (2008).
12There are usually multiple precincts per municipality, and most districts are comprised of many munic-
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Using this model, one can dismiss the null of sincere voting if it is possible to reject
H0 :  = 1. Clearly, in all specications of Table 3 that control for candidates' idiosyncrasies,
the slope between list and candidate votes is considerably smaller than one (p < :001). On
average, only nine out of ten voters stick with the same party's candidate. Put dierently,
for about 10% of agents observed choices are inconsistent with sincere behavior.
Of course, all hypothesis tests are joint tests of the null and the underlying assumptions.
Under the null hypothesis, list and candidate votes must reveal voters' true preferences over
parties and candidates, respectively. The actual identifying assumption then is not that list
votes proxy for preferences, but that tastes for parties and candidates are heavily correlated,
at least after strongly controlling for candidate quality. This assumption is testable.
To see that is does appear to hold, consider the lower two panels in Table 3. The middle one
restricts attention to the eventual winner and runner-up of each race. Voters who support
the parties associated with these candidates have no strategic reason to cast split ballots.
After all, surprises in large-scale elections are very rare, and partisans have no incentive to
desert someone they should have believed to be in contention for victory. Thus, if party
votes are, indeed, heavily correlated with individuals' preferences over candidates, then, in
this subsample of the data, party and candidate vote shares ought to track each other very
closely. Conversely, seeing a slope considerably smaller than unity should lead one to question
the identifying assumption.
Fortunately, there is no indication that this is warranted. After accounting for candidate
quality, candidate and list vote shares move together almost one for one. Taking the estimate
in column (5) at face value, it appears that, on the margin, an extra list vote results in about
:989 additional candidate votes. Although the point estimate is quite precise, it is not possible
to rule out that it is exactly equal to one.13
By contrast, the bottom panel focuses on candidates who nished in third place or worse.
At least some agents who voted for the parties associated with these candidates had a
strategic incentive to cast split ballots; and about one in three did so. Taken together, the
results in Table 3 reject the null hypothesis that all voters are \behavioral."
4. Quantifying Deviations from Instrumental Rationality
4.1. Econometric Approach
Strictly speaking, the evidence thus far only shows that observed choices are incompatible
with sincere behavior for about 10% of voters. It does not rule out that most agents are
ipalities. This allows for straightforward identication of m;k;t.
13Appendix Table A.1 repeats this exercise, but allows for  to vary with candidates' rank. Again, for
those candidates whom voters ought to have expected to be \in the race,"  is very close to unity.
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strategic but happen to cast ballots that are also consistent with sincerity. In order to
shed light on how frequently the predictions of canonical rational choice theory are actually
violated, and to inform our understanding of the extent to which individuals behave \as if"
they are unboundedly rational, this section pursues two related empirical strategies.
The rst strategy identies the share of voters whose choices deviate from instrumental
rationality by considering only candidates who were clearly not in contention for victory.
This approach's main requirement is that, conditional on the equilibrium being observed by
the econometrician, one can nd a subset of nominees whom rational voters cannot have
believed to be \in the race." For this set of candidates, one then estimates
(2) vCk;r;t = m;k;t + v
L
k;r;t + k;r;t;
where all symbols are as dened above.14
The parameter of interest is . It denotes the fraction of party supporters who stick with the
associated candidate despite her being \out of the race." As explained at the end of Section
2, the share of agents whose observed choices violate the canonical pivotal voter model is a
lower bound on the actual fraction of noninstrumentally rational voters. The reason is that,
without observing individuals' true preferences, some choices will appear consistent with
instrumental rationality, even though agents were not strategically motivated.
Thus, one reason to control for candidate quality by including municipality- and year-
specic candidate xed eects, i.e. m;k;t, is to tighten the estimated bound. The more
important reason, however, is to ensure that  can, in fact, be interpreted as a lower bound.
In the absence of individual-level data on vote combinations, there remains the possibility
that candidate k received a substantial share of her votes from the supporters of other parties.
Although the behavior of these individuals is also inconsistent with instrumental rationality,
simply dividing the number of candidate votes by the number of party votes might lead to
an overestimate of the share of behavioral agents|in extreme cases this ratio might even
exceed one. It is, therefore, preferable to explicitly control for candidate quality and estimate
 at the margin. That is,  is identied from changes in candidates' vote shares as a result
of cross-precinct variation in the vote shares of the associated parties.15
Of course, if one were willing to assume that list votes are a good proxy for voters' (induced)
preferences over candidates, then most of these issues would become moot. In the ideal case
14It is straightforward to derive equation (2) from a simple model along the lines of Myerson and Weber
(1993), extended to include a sincere type of voter (see Spenkuch 2013).
15It turns out that simply dividing the number of candidate votes by the number of party votes would result
in estimates that are qualitatively similar, but a few percentage points higher than those in the following
subsection. The empirical strategy in this paper thus errs on the side of being conservative when it comes
to classifying choices as inconsistent with instrumental rationality.
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in which preferences over parties and candidates are perfectly correlated,  would exactly
identify the fraction of voters who fail to abandon their prefered candidate despite her being
out of the race. While the evidence in the middle panel of Table 3 suggests that such an
assumption may not be completely unreasonable|especially after carefully controlling for
candidates' idiosyncrasies|it is important to emphasize that it is not required. Without it,
the point estimates still recover a lower bound on the share of behavioral agents.
Also note that, as long as there is no heterogeneity in , it is irrelevant if the set of
candidates who are included in the sample used to estimate equation (2) is chosen too
conservatively, i.e. if one discards some candidates who were also believed to be \out of the
race." Settling on a too narrowly dened set of noncontenders would only come at a loss of
statistical power, but it would not prevent consistent estimation of .
If, however, there is heterogeneity in  and if this heterogeneity is systematically correlated
with who remains in contention for victory, then restricting attention to supporters of parties
that eld candidates who trail far behind might lead to biased estimates. The second (and,
therefore, preferred) empirical strategy addresses this problem by adopting a data-driven
approach to classifying contestants.16
To see that the actual data are highly predictive of which candidates end up competing
for a direct mandate, consider Table 4, which shows a cross-tabulation of candidates' own
rank (based on the candidate vote) against the standing of their party among voters in the
same district (based on the list vote). Out of the 598 contestants whose party placed rst,
only 41 did not win a direct mandate, and a mere 2 nished third or worse. In contrast,
none of the candidates who ran for a party ranked fourth or below came in rst, and only 3
nished second. Overall, the correlation between list and candidate vote based rank is :93.
The evidence, therefore, suggests that voters coordinate on the nominees of the district's
most popular parties.
If one believes that agents do, indeed, play focal equilibria of this type, then contestants
backed by one of a district's two favored parties should be considered serious contenders,
whereas candidates of parties ranked fourth and below are \out of the race." The only
ambiguity arises with respect to those in third place. In practice, almost 10% of third ranked
contestants nish rst or second. Hence, one would want to classify some (but not all) of
them as contenders, especially in cases in which only a few percentage points separate their
own party from the one in second place.17
16Unfortunately, pre-election surveys in Germany are too small to derive reliable estimates of voters' expec-
tations. For instance, in only 50 electoral districts did the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)|the
best available data source|survey more than 15 adults prior to the 2009 elections.
17There are always at least two candidates \in the race," even if one of them trails far behind (see Myerson
2000; Myerson and Weber 1993). Cox (1994) shows that there may even exist equilibria with three or more
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Drawing from the literature on structural breaks in time series data, it is possible to
estimate a cuto value, , separating candidates into contenders and noncontenders. More
specically, the second empirical strategy classies candidate k as a contender if, and only if,
her party trails a district's second most popular candidate by less than  percentage points.
With this denition in hand, the estimating equation becomes












d;t   vLk;d;t  
i
+ k;r;t:
Here, vLk;d;t denotes the list vote share of candidate k's party in district d, and v
L;2nd
d;t is that
of the second most popular party in the same district.
If (3) is correctly specied, then searching for the value of  that maximizes the R2 yields
a super-consistent estimate of the true break point (Hansen 2000). Moreover, under the null
hypothesis that such a point exists, estimates of the model's other parameters are normally
distributed, and standard errors need not be adjusted for sampling variability in the location
of the break (see, e.g., Bai 1997).
Although intuitively appealing, there is no guarantee that this method classies all candi-
dates correctly. For this reason, Section 4.4 performs a series of robustness checks, demon-
strating that the main results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to more than 25
alternative assumptions on how voters form beliefs about which candidates are in contention
for victory.
4.2. Main Results
Focusing on nominees of the ve major parties, Table 5 displays the main results. The upper
panel follows the rst empirical strategy and restricts the sample to candidates who trailed
the runner-up by more than 10 percentage points. The lower panel implements the second
approach.
The rst row within each panel presents estimates of the share of behavioral voters, i.e.
those who stick with a party's candidate despite her having no chance of winning. Controlling
for the idiosyncrasies of candidates and their competitors, estimates of  range from :613 to
:657 and are fairly precise. Moreover, it is worth noting that the evidence from both empirical
approaches lines up very well. Despite small standard errors, estimates from the rst and
second approaches are statistically indistinguishable. Taken at face value, the results indicate
that (at least) 65% of voters do not behave in accordance with the canonical rational choice
model.
An important question is whether most agents who do cast split ballots when it is optimal
contenders.
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to do so are, in fact, strategically motivated. Strictly speaking, any model that predicts the
candidate{list vote gradient for noncontenders to lie between zero and one is consistent with
the evidence presented in Table 5. For instance, some fraction of individuals might simply
vote for whichever candidate advertises the most, and advertising expenditures may be highly
correlated with who remains in contention for victory. It would, therefore, appear as if some
voters abandon weak candidates, despite the fact that most agents do not behave tactically.
In such a case, the estimates above might severely understate the extent of \behavioral"
voting.
In order to rule out mechanical explanations of this kind, Table 6 compares estimates of
 across a number of dierent settings. The rst set of results demonstrates that the extent
to which observed behavior violates instrumental rationality depends on who remains in
contention for victory. That is, conditional on voting for a party whose candidate is \out
of the race," agents are about 25 percentage points less likely to stick with a noncontestant
when the candidate of an allied party is still \in the race" than when faced with the choice
among two evils, i.e. less palatable alternatives.18 A Chow test for equality of coecients
rejects the null hypothesis of equal point estimates at the 1%-level.
Moreover, distinguishing between races that were \close" and those that were not, sincere
voting appears to have been less prevalent in the former|though the dierence is not sta-
tistically signicant|and disaggregating the data by election year shows that desertion of
noncontenders was signicantly more common in 2005 than in 2009 (p < :001).
This is not surprising. The 2005 election followed a failed motion of condence that trig-
gered the dissolution of the Bundestag and was widely perceived to be a \critical election,"
in which dierences between parties and, therefore, the stakes were signicantly higher than
usual (Korte 2009).19 In line with these results, ocial statistics show a substantially larger
fraction of split tickets in 2005, and an approximately 7 percentage points higher turnout
than in 2009 (Bundeswahlleiter 2006, 2010).
The change in turnout, however, is too small to account for the entire dierence in .
Estimating the share of behavioral voters for each municipality-year combination separately
and regressing the resulting k;t on turnout in the respective village in the same year yields a
point estimate of :698 (with a standard error of :173). Based on this evidence, a 7 percentage
point increase in turnout would be predicted to lead to an approximately 4:9 percentage
18The following parties are dened as allies: CDU and FDP, SPD and Green Party. Results are qualitatively
similar if supporters of The Left are assumed to consider SPD candidates to be close substitutes. Also, note
that there were no uncontested races in 2005 and 2009.
19Campaigning to stay in oce, Chancellor Schroder and his SPD{Green coalition promised to undo
some of their unpopular labor market and welfare reforms while raising taxes on the rich. In stark contrast,
led by Angela Merkel, the conservative{libertarian bloc sought to further increase the pace and scope of
deregulation, slashing income taxes and public spending in the process.
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points lower fraction of behavioral voters. While the available evidence does suggest that
inframarginal voters are considerably more likely to violate instrumental rationality than
marginal ones, a 7 percentage point increase in turnout would not cause a near 50% change
in the estimated extent of sincere voting. Some simple back-of-the-envelope calculations show
that this conclusion continues to hold even if every additional voter is assumed to behave
strategically.20
Importantly, the results in Table 6 are at odds with many mechanical theories for why
voters abandon candidates who are \out of the race." Any model in which voters desert
candidates for nonstrategic reasons would not only have to predict a correlation between
desertion rates and a contestant's chance of winning, but it would also have to explain why
defection is more common among marginal voters, when the stakes are higher, and why it
depends on which candidates remain in contention for victory. The patterns above, as well
as the fact that voters who do cast split tickets substitute toward candidates of a potential
coalition partner (cf. Table 1), suggests that desertion is, in fact, driven by instrumentally
rational considerations.
4.3. Interpreting the Evidence
Neither the canonical rational choice model nor behavioral theories in which agents simply
vote for their favorite candidates are able to explain the ndings above. Instead, the evidence
suggests that it might be more appropriate to consider strategic behavior a conscious decision
rather than an agent's \type." That is, all agents may be capable of voting tactically, but only
for a subset of them do the subjective benets outweigh the (psychic) costs of abandoning
the candidate of one's preferred party or of guring out one's optimal strategy. In such a
richer model,  would not refer to the population share of behavioral \types," but to the
fraction of voters whose costs are below some endogenously determined threshold.21
If a large share of voters have costs very close, but not exactly equal, to zero, then such
a hybrid model with boundedly rational agents would predict the two most-salient features
of the data: (i) most voters do not (nd it worthwhile to) abandon weak candidates, but
(ii) when the stakes increase, agents' tendency to \waste their vote" plummets. That is, a
20In 2005, about 13.3 million voters chose a party whose direct candidate is estimated to be \out of the
race," and almost half of them also abandoned the respective nominees. Suppose that every single one of the
approximately 4 million additional voters in 2005 chose a party whose direct candidate was not in contention
for victory and deserted the respective direct candidate. If this were, indeed, the case, then about 70% of
the inframarginal voters, i.e. 6.5 out of 9.3 million, would not have behaved instrumentally rational. Even
under these extreme assumptions, the dierence in turnout cannot account for only the entire change in .
21Strictly speaking, the ndings above are silent on the source of these costs. For instance, plausbile sources
of \psychic" costs are a preference for consistency across domains, social image or identity, true cognitive
constraints, or any other impediment to making optimal choices. Even irrational optimisim about underdogs'
chances of winning would produce qualitatively similar patterns.
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signicant share of agents are close enough to the margin, so that small changes in absolute
payos cause large shifts in observed behavior.
Another potential explanation for the preceding ndings is that individuals receive a het-
erogeneously distributed utility boost from voting for the eventual winner of the election. If
the utility benet from doing so was close, but not exactly equal, to zero for suciently many
agents, then such a model of \bandwagon eects" (Simon 1954) would be able to rationalize
(i). Moreover, if the benet of voting for the winner depends on the perceived stakes of the
election, then bandwagon eects might also be consistent with (ii).
The key testable dierence between both theories is that the latter predicts runner-ups to
be abandoned as well, especially those who trail far behind and are, therefore, unlikely to win.
By contrast, a pivotal voter model in which agents face a cost from behaving strategically
predicts that agents do not abandon the runner-up, even if her chances of winning are very
small. This is because if a race were to be tied|however unlikely that may be|the tie would
almost certainly involve the second-ranked candidate (see Myerson 2000, 2002; Myerson and
Weber 1993), in which case voting for her would change the outcome of the election. Thus,
even agents who choose to cast tactical ballots would not abandon a runner-up who trails
far behind.
Although counterintuitive, the evidence in Table 7 supports this prediction. The numbers
therein refer to the slope parameter, i.e.  in equation (1), estimated separately for rst-
and second-ranked candidates, by distance between the two. Perhaps surprisingly, all point
estimates are rather close to one, and, if anything, the coecients for second-ranked candi-
dates are slightly larger than those for their rst-ranked counterparts. This helps to rule out
alternative explanations based on bandwagon eects.
4.4. Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
Misclassication of Contenders For the main results to correctly identify , it must
be the case that the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term. One obvious source of
bias may be systematic misclassication of contenders. While it is unproblematic to falsely
classify some candidates whom voters believed to be \out of the race" as contenders, at least
as long as  is not heterogenously distributed, making the opposite mistake would lead to
upward bias in  and, therefore, to an overstatement of the extent to which observed behavior
violates instrumental rationality. To ameliorate this concern, Table 8 presents estimates of 
employing more than twenty-ve alternative denitions of contenders (listed in the column
on the left). For each denition, the table shows two estimates: one based on candidate-year
xed eects, and another one using candidate-year xed eects that are specic to individual
municipalities. For comparison, the top row displays the main results from the lower panel
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of Table 5.
Although individual point estimates do, of course, vary, the majority of them are very close
to their baseline values. For instance, assuming that voters have perfect foresight regarding
the winner and runner-up of the election, one would estimate the fraction of behavioral votes
to equal 66:3% instead of 65:6%, whereas adaptive expectations based on the outcome of the
last election (i.e. the winner and runner-up in the previous federal election are believed to be
\in the race") would lead to point estimates ranging from 67:8% to 71:3%. Of the fty-two
additional estimates in Table 8, the lowest one is 58:9% and the highest one equals 71:6%.
Slightly more than 90% of coecients fall within the original 95%-condence intervals. The
evidence, therefore, suggests that misclassication of contestants is not a rst-order problem.
Exact Indierence Some individuals could be exactly indierent about who carries their
district, and might therefore stick with a candidate who is \out of the race." The empirical
strategy in this paper would classify these agents as \behavioral," leading to estimates of 
that include indierent voters.
One piece of evidence suggesting that the vast majority of voters are not indierent to
who represents them in parliament comes from the fact that less than 2% of those going
to the polls cast invalid or no candidate votes (despite the fact that it is possible to cast
a valid list vote while leaving the candidate vote blank). For the U.S., for instance, it has
been argued that ballot roll-o (i.e. voters not completing one of several sections on the
ballot) is a sign of voters not caring \enough" about a particular race (e.g., Bullock and
Dunn 1996; Burnham 1965). If Germans were exactly indierent about district-level races,
then one would not expect them to be willing to incur even a small \hassle cost" to cast
their candidate vote. The fact that more than 98% of voters do cast valid candidate votes
suggests that the potential bias from exact indierence is likely very small.
Endogenous Nomination of Candidates Another concern relates to the behavior of
parties. Depending on the anticipated likelihood of winning the district, parties might nomi-
nate a particularly \good" or \bad" candidate. Since the empirical strategy relies on within-
candidate variation, this sort of behavior could bias the point estimates if candidate quality
interacts with the share of voters who choose to behave sincerely|say, because voters might
be reluctant to abandon very charismatic contestants. Although plausible, the data do not
suggest that \good" candidates, as measured by k;t, are less likely to be deserted when they
are \out of the race." If anything, estimating separate slope parameters for all candidate-year
combinations and regressing them on the estimated xed eects shows that the covariance
between k;t and a noncontender's k;t is slightly negative.
One may also be worried that parties eld \better" candidates in districts in which they
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have more supporters and that this may lead to bias in . However, estimating  for each
candidate-year combination and regressing the resulting k;t on the district-wide list vote as
a measure of party strength yields a point estimate of :001 with a standard error of :003,
which is not only economically small but also statistically indistinguishable from zero. Put
dierently, local party strength is nearly uncorrelated with the estimated share of voters who
stick with the respective candidate.
To get a sense of how  varies with candidates' observational characteristics, consider
Appendix Table A.2. Although voters appear to desert younger candidates somewhat more
frequently than older ones, the point estimates have a very similar range as those in Table
8, which suggests that there is no single type of candidate that drives the results. That is,
even if one were to focus on the types of candidates delivering the most-extreme estimates,
one would still conclude that neither the pivotal voter model nor a theory based on sincere
voting provides an accurate description of reality.
Also note that the results cannot be driven by comparisons between direct candidates and
those on the party list. While it is theoretically possible that some agents desert their favorite
party's candidate because they would like someone else on the party list to enter parliament
instead (see Section 2 or Appendix A for details on how seats are allocated), this behavior
should not aect the estimates. The reason is simple. None of the identifying variation comes
from candidates who are in contention for victory, i.e. who have a realistic chance of entering
the Bundestag and for whom this sort of comparison is theoretically relevant. Moreover,
whatever voters may think about the marginal candidates on parties' lists, it continues to be
true that voting for someone who is not in contention for victory will not aect the outcome
of the election and is, therefore, inconsistent with the predictions of the pivotal voter model.
Strategic List Votes As explained above, interpreting  as a lower bound on the share
of \behavioral" voters does not require an assumption as to whether list votes accurately
reveal voters' preferences|although Table 3 contains some suggestive evidence that it may
not be unreasonable to think so, especially since proportional representation provides voters
with much weaker strategic incentives than plurality rule. The clear benet of imposing such
an assumption would be that  need not be regarded as a lower bound anymore. In order
to provide additional evidence consistent with voters choosing their favorite party according
to their (induced) preferences, Appendix B presents an explicit (though imperfect) test of
strategic voting in the PR part of the German system. Intuitively, if voters cast strategic
list votes, one would expect parties to \bunch" near thresholds where they gain (or lose)
a seat|simply because parties can only be awarded integer mandates. In reality, however,
fractional mandates are approximately uniformly distributed on the unit interval, as one
would expect if strategic list votes were quantitatively unimportant.
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Additional Robustness Checks The remainder of Table 9 demonstrates that the results
do not depend on the weighting scheme nor on whether one also includes candidates of \micro
parties."
5. Observed Violations of Instrumental Rationality and Voter Characteristics
The evidence above shows that a nontrivial fraction of agents does not behave as predicted by
standard theories of voting. Though it does appear that the share of voters whose behavior
violates canonical rational choice decreases with the electoral stakes, most agents just stick
with weak candidates. Simple averages, however, may conceal considerable heterogeneity
across individuals, which is why it is also important to understand who votes \behaviorally."
In order to infer whether  varies with the characteristics of the electorate, the present
paper relies on ocial statistics for the universe of German cities and villages, published by
the Federal Statistical Oce and the statistical oces of the Lander (Statistische Amter des
Bundes und der Lander 2007, 2011).22 After aggregating election results to the village level
and focusing on the set of municipalities that are fully contained within an electoral district,
it is straightforward to estimate specications that allow for  to increase or decrease in
some village characteristic.
Table 10 displays the results. The rst column demonstrates that aggregation to the mu-
nicipality level does not materially aect the point estimates. The remaining four columns
examine how  changes with population density, income tax revenue per capita, as well as
the gender and age composition of the electorate. For ease of interpretation, covariates have
been demeaned, so that the estimates in the second row refer to the share of behavioral
voters at the sample average.
Interestingly, urban voters are not less behavioral than rural ones, nor is there a signicant
gender gap. The results do, however, indicate dierences with respect to socioeconomic status
(as proxied by income tax revenue per capita) and age.
Since the income tax variable captures only revenues that accrue to the respective munici-
palities, and given that the German tax system is highly nonlinear, it is easiest to judge the
magnitude of the coecient by an example. Consider two villages: one's per capita income
tax revenue is a standard deviation below the mean, while that of the other village is one
standard deviation above the sample average.23 The share of voters who do not abandon a
weak candidate is estimated to be almost 6 percentage points lower in the latter.
Disparities by age are even larger. Taken at face value, the coecient in column (5) suggests
22Unfortunately, comparable data for polling precincts do not exist. Polling precincts are too small to
produce reliable estimates from existing data sets.
23On average, municipalities receive about 13% of all income tax revenues. Thus, the per capita sample
mean is 260 EUR and the standard deviation equals 110 EUR.
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that observed violations of the pivotal voter model are almost universal among voters below
the age of 30, i.e. those who could have participated in, at most, three federal elections. Of
course, the respective estimate is based on limited variation and is therefore not very precise.
But, together with the results in column (4), it suggests that sophistication and experience
correlate with the extent to which agents act in accordance with traditional rational choice
theory.
To further investigate the eect of experience, the remainder of this section uses the Ger-
man Reunication as a natural experiment. Although the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) held regular, formal elections to the Volkskammer (People's Chamber), they were
eectively meaningless. East Germans could only choose from candidates on a single list
controlled by the Socialist Unity Party (SED), and it was customary to cast one's ballot
in public, simply accepting all nominated candidates. Unsurprisingly, ocial approval rates
often exceeded 99%. Free, democratic elections were only held on March 18, 1990|after
months of peaceful political protest. The newly elected government then negotiated the end
of the GDR.
In stark contrast, citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany had the opportunity to
participate in free elections since 1949, and, from 1953 on, under a two-ballot system almost
identical to the current one. Thus, they had more than 40 years of democratic experience by
the time the GDR joined the West.
The rst parliamentary elections in unied Germany were held on December 2, 1990 and
were subject to (essentially) the same rules that had previously been used in the West and
that continue to be in place today.24 If experience and familiarity with the electoral system
do indeed matter, then one would expect large initial dierences in the share of agents whose
behavior is at odds with instrumental rationality, which should disappear over time.
This prediction is borne out in Figure 2. For each election since 1990, the gure plots
the estimated dierence in the share of behavioral voters between East and West Germany.
Negative values indicate more violations of the pivotal voter model among residents of the
former GDR.25
The results show that just two months after reunication, East Germans were almost 16
percentage points more likely to stick with a noncontender than their Western counterparts.
By 2005, however, the gap had vanished. Although none of the point estimates is very precise,
24The most important exception was that the 5%-threshold applied separately to East and West Germany.
Thus, in 1990 a party had to gain more than 5% of the list vote in only one of the two regions to enter the
Bundestag.
25The specication on which the estimates are based is similar to equation (3) but allows for dierent
slopes and cuto values in East and West Germany. A qualitatively similar picture would emerge if one were
to restrict the cuto to be the same in both regions.
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one can nevertheless reject the null hypothesis of a constant dierence at the 1%-signicance
level. Moreover, both the initial gap as well as the speed of convergence are in line with the
\age eect" in Table 10.26
6. Related Literature
There exists a large empirical literature concerned with the extent of instrumental ratio-
nality in voting. Within this literature, laboratory experiments provide typically convincing
evidence of tactical behavior by some, but not all, individuals (e.g., Duy and Tavits 2008;
Eckel and Holt 1989; Esponda and Vespa 2013). Interestingly, the share of strategic agents
generally increases with subjects' experience and the availability of coordination devices, such
as pre-election polls (e.g., Forsythe et al. 1993, 1996). However, given the relatively small
number of subjects in the laboratory, it remains unknown whether these results generalize
to large, real-world elections.
The evidence on this question is decidedly mixed. Coate et al. (2008), for instance, reject
the pivotal voter model based on the nding that it is unable to replicate winning margins
in Texas liquor referenda. Reed (1990) and Cox (1994), however, argue that the distribution
of votes in Japan's multimember districts does conform to the predictions of rational choice
theory. More recently, Fujiwara (2011) uses a sharp regression discontinuity in Brazilian
mayoral elections to show that third-place candidates are more likely to be deserted in races
under simple plurality rule than in runo elections. The most comprehensive study to date is
Cox (1997). His ndings are suggestive of strategic behavior in a number of electoral systems
but indicate a lack thereof in others.
Even less is known about the extent of instrumental rationality among voters, or violations
thereof. Two recent exceptions are Spenkuch (2014) as well as Kawai and Watanabe (2013).
Spenkuch (2014) exploits a highly unusual by-election in Germany, which allowed a party
to gain one seat by receiving fewer votes, to show that at least 9% of voters did not behave
sincerely.
Kawai and Watanabe (2013) estimate a fully structural model of voting decisions in Japan's
general election, concluding that between 63% and 85% of voters are strategic|but in equi-
librium less than 5% cast misaligned votes. Put dierently, Kawai and Watanabe (2013)
estimate that, at most, 37% of Japanese voters are sincere, whereas this paper derives a
lower bound of about 65%. Whether this discrepancy is due to systematic dierences in
the environment (say, higher stakes in Japanese elections), true dierences in the rationality
26Of course, not only did East Germans gain familiarity with the electoral system, but other economic
factors changed as well. If these factors had an independent eect on the propensity to cast tactical ballots,
then the estimates in Figure 2 would not need to capture the true impact of experience. Convergence in per
capita incomes, however, is almost an order of magnitude too small to explain the results.
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of the underlying populations, or dierences in the empirical approach is (as of yet) un-
known. Although Japan uses a mixed-member electoral system similar to the German one,
it is important to note that the analysis in Kawai and Watanabe (2013) makes no use of
party votes. All identication comes from variation in candidate vote shares and observable
characterictics of voters.
Recall, the fundamental diculty in inferring (non)strategic behavior from naturally oc-
curring data is that voters' preferences are not observed. Thus, any existing evidence is either
based on indirect tests (as in Coate et al. 2008; Cox 1997; Fujiwara 2011; Spenkuch 2014),
or preference orderings are structurally estimated in order to compare them to actual vote
counts (as in Kawai and Watanabe 2013).
A separate strand of the literature tries to circumvent these problems by using survey data
on voting decisions and political orientations (see, e.g., Abramson et al. 1992; Blais et al.
2001; Kiewiet 2013; Niemi et al. 1993; or, for Germany, Gschwend 2007; Pappi and Thurner
2002). Estimates in this tradition are often very low. Wright (1990, 1992), however, points to
important survey biases and raises serious doubts about conclusions based on self-reported
votes. Alvarez and Nagler (2000) even show that, depending on the survey design, estimates
of instrumentally rational voting dier by as much as a factor of seven.
7. Concluding Remarks
Whether individuals act approximately \as if" they are unboundedly rational is an important
question in economics. In the context of social choice it has interested scholars for more than
six decades. Yet, outside of the laboratory it has proven extremely dicult to quantify
deviations from the baseline pivotal voter model. By exploiting the incentive structure of
parliamentary elections in Germany, the present paper presents evidence indicating that at
least 65% of voters do not behave as predicted by standard rational choice theory.
Of course, in light of a plethora of anecdotal evidence, one might not have expected literally
all agents to be \perfectly rational," especially not in large elections with arguably weak
electoral incentives. Nevertheless, the results above are noteworthy for at least two reasons.
First, the magnitude of the point estimates implies that the single most common assumption
about the behavior of voters is violated for the vast majority of agents. Second, the leading
alternative theory according to which voters sincerely choose their most preferred candidate
is also rejected by the data.
Instead, the ndings indicate that individuals' tendency to deviate from the predictions of
standard rational choice theory varies substantially with the circumstances. That is, even in
large elections with weak incentives, small absolute changes in expected payos are associated
with large shifts in behavior. Viewed through the lens of a model in which boundedly rational
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agents pay a \psychic" cost to behave strategically, the results suggest that a signicant
number of people face very low costs and are thus close to the margin of acting strategically.
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A. Calculating a Party's Number of Seats
Following Spenkuch (2014), this appendix explains the algorithm that is currently used to
calculate a party's number of seats in the Bundestag. Let dp;s denote the number of direct
mandates accruing to party p in state s. vp;s is the number of list votes that p received in s,
with the equivalent number on the national level given by vp =
P
s vp;s. With this notation
in hand, party p's seat total is calculated in three steps:
Step 1: Proportional Allocation of List Mandates to Parties. Absent overhang mandates,
there are 598 seats in the Bundestag. These are allocated by proportionality rule to the set
of parties clearing the 5%-threshold or winning at least three direct mandates. That is, the




p02eP vp0 if p 2 eP
0 otherwise
;
where eP = pj vpP
p0 vp0
 :05 _Ps dp;s  3 and = represents equality after rounding accord-
ing to the Sainte-Lague method, which ensures that
P
p lp = 598.
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Step 2: Proportional Allocation of Mandates to State Lists. German electoral law requires
parties to compete with dierent lists in each state. Therefore, list mandates need to be
allocated to the respective state lists. In practice, the number of mandates awarded to a
party's state list is proportional to the list's contribution to the party's vote total. More





if p 2 eP
0 otherwise
;
where = is dened as above.
Step 3: Determination of the Actual Number of Seats. However, the actual number of
seats that party p receives in state s is given by
np;s = max fd p;s; lp;sg :
If d p;s < lp;s then, in addition to the district winners, the rst lp;s   d p;s candidates on p's
list in s are elected to the Bundestag as well. Otherwise, only holders of direct mandates
27In 2005 the method of Hare-Niemeyer was used instead.
receive a seat.
Note that only if d p;s  lp;s for all s, will party p's seat total, np = Ps np;s , be equal to
the number of seats it would be assigned under proportional representation, i.e. lp.
B. Testing for Strategic Voting under Proportionality Rule
The main text notes that if one is willing to assume that strategic voting in the plurality rule
part of the German system (i.e. with the list vote) is unimportant, then list votes provide
an empirical proxy for voters' preferences. This implies that the estimates in the main part
part of the paper can be interpreted as the fraction of voters who stick with their preferred
candidate despite her being \out of the race." Table 3 provides some suggestive evidence
that such assumption, though strong, may not be unreasonable. This appendix provides an
additional test.
Given that the main results focus on the 2005 and 2009 elections, in which all major
parties were widely expected to clear the 5%-threshold, voters should have no theoretical
incentive to cast strategic list votes if the party they would like to gain the marginal seat in
parliament could, indeed, be awarded the fractional mandate associated with an additional
vote. In reality, however, parties can only be awarded whole mandates, which means that
some may be closer to thresholds where they gain (or lose) a seat. Thus, if voters casted
strategic list votes one would expect parties to \bunch" near the endogenously determined
cuto levels.28 By contrast, if voters cast sincere list votes one would expect parties' number
of fractional mandates to be approximately uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Table A.2 presents the results of this test. The upper panel shows the initial distribution
of fractional mandates according to the list vote on the national level (i.e. before applying
the rounding methods of Hare-Niemeier or Sainte-Lague). The lower panel displays parties'
initial number of fractional mandates by state. While the former distribution determines the
total number of list mandates a given party receives in parliament, the latter one governs how
a party's number of seats are allocated across states (cf. Appendix A). The p-values below
each panel refer to Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the null hypothesis that the distribution of
fractional mandates is uniform on the unit interval.
Clearly, based on this approach it is not possible{neither on the national nor on the state
level|to reject the null and, therefore, the assumption that individuals cast list votes that
reveal their (induced) preferences over which party wins the marginal seat in parliament.
28In 2005 the method of Hare-Niemeyer for \rounding", whereas the Sainte-Lague method was used in
2009. It is important to note that whether a party's number of seats in parliament is adjusted upwards or
downwards depends in both of these methods not just on its own (fractional) vote share, but also on that of
other parties.
C. Variable Denitions
This appendix provides a description of all data used in the paper, as well as precise deni-
tions together with the sources of all variables.
C.1. Election Results
Data containing the ocial results of the 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, and 1998 federal
elections by municipality (Gemeinde) as well as the 2002, 2005, and 2009 elections by polling
precinct (Wahlbezirk) have been purchased from the Federal Returning Ocer. These data
include information on the number of list and candidate votes for each party and each
candidate, the number of eligible voters, as well as the number of valid and invalid votes. In
2009 there were approximately 89,000 precincts. Whenever necessary precinct level numbers
are aggregated using the municipality identiers contained in the raw data. Municipalities
spanning multiple districts are discarded. Throughout the analysis the following variables
are used:
Number of Eligible Voters is dened as the number of residents of each precinct that were
allowed to vote in the particular year. In general this encompasses all German citizens over
the age of 18, who have not been declared mentally unt, or whose voting rights have not
been suspended due to criminal behavior.
Turnout is dened as the number of actual voters over the number of eligible voters. This
number cannot be calculated for absentee precincts, as absentee voters are included in the
number of eligible voters in their district of residence. Hence, in-person turnout in each
district needs to be adjusted for absentee voters. In practice, this is done by multiplying the
number of issued absentee ballots by .95 (which corresponds to the empirical frequency with
which they are cast) and adding them to the ballots that are cast in person.
Share of List Vote is dened as the portion of all valid list votes (in %) that are cast for
a particular party. \Micro parties", i.e. those not clearing the 5%-threshold, are grouped
together.
Share of Candidate Vote is dened as the portion of all valid candidate votes (in %) that
are cast for the candidate of a particular party. Votes for candidates of \micro parties" are
pooled.
Absentee Precinct is an indicator variable equal to one if a given precinct handles only
absentee ballots.
C.2. Candidate Characteristics
Prior to every election to the Bundestag the Federal Returning Ocer publishes information
on certain characteristics of all ocial list and direct candidates. This paper focuses only on
the latter. The data have been compiled from Bundeswahlleiter (2005c, 2009b). Throughout
the analysis the following variables are used:
Age at the time of the election is dened as election year minus year of birth.
Female is an indicator variable equal to one if a candidate is female, and zero otherwise.
Doctorate is an indicator variable equal to one if a candidate holds a doctoral degree and/or
a professorship, and zero otherwise. As doctoral degrees are part of Germans' ocial names,
this variable has been created using a text search for \Dr." and \Prof.".
Currently Member of Parliament is an indicator variable equal to one if the candidate holds
a list or direct mandate, and zero otherwise.
Holds Direct Mandate is an indicator variable equal to one if the candidate holds a direct
mandate, and zero otherwise.
Also on Part List is an indicator variable equal to one if the candidate does not only run
in the district race, but is also on her party's state list (and could thus enter the Bundestag
either way).
Position on Party List denotes the candidate's rank on her party's state list (conditional on
having been placed on the list).
C.3. Municipality Characteristics
Information on municipalities' demographic and socio-economic characteristics is taken from
Statistik lokal 2007 and Statistik lokal 2011 (Statistische Amter des Bundes und der Lander
2007, 2011). Statistik lokal is an annual publication of the German Federal Statistical Of-
ce and the statistical oces of the Lander containing data on various characteristics of
approximately 12,000 municipalities and administrative units in Germany as of about two
years before to the publication date. These data have been linked with the election results
described above using the municipality identier (Allgemeiner Gemeindeschlussel) contained
in both data sets. Below follows a brief description of all municipality level variables used
throughout the analysis.
Population Density is dened as a municipality's total average population (in thousands)
per square kilometer during the respective calendar year.
Fraction of Voters Female is dened as the share of women among a municipality's popula-
tion over the age of 18.
Income Tax Revenue Per Capita is dened as the total income tax receipts (in 1,000 EUR)
accruing to the respective municipality divided by its population during the same calendar
year.
Fraction of Voters under Age 30 is dened as the fraction of individuals aged 18{30 among
those over the age of 18.
D. Structural Analysis
Although the reduced form results in the main text provide evidence of sincere as well as
strategic voting, they are subject to some limitations. For instance, the assumption that
candidate quality enters (2) linearly might be overly restrictive. Taken literally, linearity
could lead to predicted vote shares that are greater than one or even negative. To properly
account for the drawbacks of the reduced form analysis and to be able to assess the impact
of non-instrumentally rational behavior, this section seeks to replicate the main results in
Table 5 by estimating a structural model of voting decisions in the 2009 federal election.
Again, list votes provide a crucial source of identifying variation.29
D.1. Adding Structure
In order to replicate the main results about the average extent of non-instrumentally rational
voting, it is convenient to group voters into two sets: strategic agents, and sincere, non-
instrumentally rational ones. Doing so comes at the cost of ignoring a voters' choice to act
strategically, but it simplies the analysis considerably. Given the very limited variation in
district size, and therefore pivot probabilities, it would be extremely challenging to identify
the distribution of psychic cost, especially near zero. The current approach can be thought
of as approximating a the population distribution by placing a mass point at zero and
estimating its \size."
The Magnitude Theorem in Myerson (2000) shows that voters will generally group con-
testants into two categories: candidates who are \in the race" and those who are not. It
is, therefore, natural to model agents' decisions as a discrete choice problem in which sin-
cere and strategic voters face dierent equilibrium choice sets. The former choose among all
contestant in a particular district, whereas the latter consider only candidates who are in
contention for victory. When it comes to the list vote, however, all voters pick from the set
of major parties.
29Results are qualitatively similar when looking at the 2005 election instead.
In order to represent agents' (induced) preference proles in a tractable yet exible fashion,
assume that individual i receives utility
(4) uLi;p = p;m + i;p + i;p
from voting for party p's list. Here, p;m denotes the average utility that agents living in
municipality m derive from voting for p, and i;p are individual specic deviations from the
mean. i;p is an i.i.d. type-I extreme value (T1EV) taste shock. Any strategic considerations
with respect to the list vote are assumed to enter via this error term.
Moreover, dene the underlying utility from casting one's candidate vote for the nominee
of party p to equal
(5) uCi;k = p;m + i;p + k + "i;k;
where k indexes candidates, and k is voters' assessment of k relative to that of her party
(and to the party's marginal list candidate in the same state). That is, k plays a very
similar role as the candidate xed eect in the reduced form part of the analysis. "i;k denotes
another i.i.d. T1EV shock.30
It is critical to note that p;m and i;p appear in both (4) and (5), implying that ocial
party positions inuence not only voters' perceptions of the respective organizations, but
also that with respect to their candidates. This assumption captures the fact that German
politicians campaign heavily on their own party's platform and it introduces the correlation
between list and candidate votes that has been the identifying source of variation in the
reduced form part of the analysis.
To allow individuals' preferences to systematically deviate from the average in their mu-
nicipality, i;p is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution with an unrestricted
covariance matrix. That is, (i;p)p2P  N (0;).31 Hence, supporters of the conservative CDU
may, for example, also have a taste for the FDP, while holding more negative views of the
communist Left.
While p;m and i;p model commonalities in voters' assessments of parties and the respective
contestants, i;p and "i;k allow for dierences in tastes that go beyond the common perception
of candidate quality, i.e. k. The T1EV assumption is convenient because it results in a
smooth closed form representation of individual choice probabilities.
30The mean utility from abstaining is normalized to zero. Since the available data do not allow turnout
to be calculated for individual precincts, the analysis in this section is conducted at the municipality level
instead (restricting attention to the set of municipalities that are fully contained within an electoral district).
31As the variance of i;p is determined by the distribution of the logit error, it is not necessary to impose
a normalization.
Given the structure of preferences, party p's expected share of the list vote in municipality
m equals
(6) bvLp;m = Z exp (p;m + i;p)1 +Pp02P exp (p0;m + i;p0)d () ;
where P denotes the set of electable parties. Note that bvLp;m does not depend on the share of
strategic voters. After all, even tactical agents have an ex ante incentive to cast truthful list
votes.
This is not true when it comes to the candidate vote. The candidate vote is a mixture of
sincere and strategic ballots:
bvCk;m = bvC;Sk;m + (1  ) bvC;Tk;m :
Here, bvC;Sk;m denotes candidate k's share among sincere voters, and bvC;Tk;m that among tactical
ones. As before,  is the fraction of agents who are sincere.
Since sincere voters consider every candidate, bvC;Sk;m is given by
(7) bvC;Sk;m = Z exp (p;m + i;p + k)1 +Pk02K(d) exp (p0;m + i;p0 + k0)d () ;
where K(d) marks the set of all contestants in district d. Tactical agents, however, behave
as if they are choosing only among the set of serious contenders, C(d). That is, irrespective
of the underlying utility in (5), strategic voters disregard all candidates that are not \in the








d () if k 2 C(d)
0 otherwise
:
A seemingly natural way to estimate (; ;; ) would be to nd the parameter combina-
tion that produces the best t between predicted vote shares and the data. This, however,
entails that preferences would be partially identied from candidate votes, which may con-
found strategic desertion with simple distaste. In order to avoid this problem, electorates'
average tastes should be inferred solely from list votes.
Accordingly, with data on C(d) and actual vote shares in hand, estimates of (; ;; )
could be obtained by minimizing the objective function:
(9) SSR











subject to the set of constraints
(10) bvLp;m = vLp;m 8p;m; d:
Yet, as C(d) is not observed, it needs to be estimated as well. Based on the evidence of
focal equilibria in Section 4.1, a candidate is assumed to be a contender if, and only if, her
party trails the district's second most popular one by less than  percentage points. Thus,
estimating C(d) adds the following set of equilibrium constraints
vL;2
nd
d   vLk;d   8k 2 C (d) ; 8d(11)
vL;2
nd
d   vLk;d >  8k =2 C (d) ;8d(12)
as well as the additional parameter .32
Given the granularity of the data, the optimization problem dened by equations (9){(12) is
extremely large. Finding the solution involves optimizing over more than 63,000 parameters,
solving about 61,500 non-linear constraints, and approximating roughly 120,000 dierent ve
dimensional integrals. To keep the computational burden manageable without compromising
the quality of the solution, the analysis relies on recent advances in numerical methods, such
as integration on sparse-grids (Heiss and Winschel 2008) and mathematical programming
with equality constraints (Dube et al. 2012; Su and Judd 2012). For a description of these
methods see Appendix E.
Before proceeding to the results it is useful to provide some intuition on how the parameters
are identied. Identication of p;m is straightforward. From Berry (1994) it follows that, for
every , there exists a unique vector  which solves (10). Economically, this means that the
list vote pins down the average taste in dierent markets.
Akin to the analysis in the main text, identication of  is based on the intuition in Figure
1. That is, the share of sincere voters can be inferred from the ratio of non-contenders'
observed vote shares (depicted on the y-axis) to those they would receive if all agents acted
solely based on their preferences (proxied by the position on the x-axis).
Candidate quality, i.e. k, can be gleaned by comparing contestant's actual performance
in dierent municipalities with predictions thereof based on party preferences and . k will
be positive for candidates whose vote shares systematically exceed their predicted values,
and negative for those who underperform.
Lastly,  is identied from the empirical covariance between non-contenders' list and con-
tenders' candidate votes. Take, for instance, a district in which the FDP candidate is out of
32Experimentation with a subset of the contender classifcations in Table 8 yielded qualitatively similar
results.
the race, while the nominee of the CDU is a contender. If the latter receives, on average, more
votes in villages that have a greater taste for the FDP, then the respective parameter in the
covariance matrix will be positive. Analogous arguments apply to the remaining elements of
.
D.2. Results and Counterfactual Experiments
With 73:7% (and a standard error of 7:8%) the estimated share of behavioral voters, i.e. , is
strikingly close to the corresponding reduced form results in Tables 5 and 6. Unfortunately,
few of the model's other parameters are easily interpretable by themselves. Thus, instead of
listing parameter estimates, the following discussion presents results in a way that relates
straightforwardly to common intuition.33
In order to judge the model's t consider Figure A.2. The upper two panels contrast the
true marginal distributions of candidate and list votes (dark bars) with those predicted by
the model (light bars). Given that (; ;; ; ) have been chosen to mimic these data, there
are practically no discernible dierences.
The lower panel depicts the frequency of valid list and candidate vote combinations. It is
important to note that information on the joint distribution of votes come from an indepen-
dent source (Bundeswahlleiter 2009a, 2010) and were not used to t the model. Thus, the
lower panel of Figure A.2 provides a strong quasi-out-of-sample test of whether the estima-
tion results are reasonable. Although there do exist dierences, on the whole the predicted
distribution matches the qualitative features of its real world counterpart fairly well, lending
credibility to the results.
Table A.4 compares actual and simulated outcomes of district level races. As can be seen
from the entries on the diagonal, the model does an excellent job at ranking candidates. In
particular, it predicts almost 95% of winners correctly.
While Figure A.2 and Table A.4 are useful in evaluating the goodness of t, a more
interesting question might be for whom supporters of dierent parties would vote if their
preferred candidate was out of the race. In order to shed light on the ordering of preferences,
Table A.5 shows the frequency with which voters would substitute toward the candidate
of any other party, assuming that all but their preferred contestant were still in the race.
Thus, the entries correspond to the probability of some other party's candidate being \the
next best choice." The model predicts FDP adherents to substitute toward candidates of
the CDU, whereas most supporters of the Green Party and The Left would choose SPD
contenders instead. Given parties' ideological positions, these patterns conform exactly to
what one would expect.
33A list of all estimates is available from the author upon request.
Based on the structural estimates, Figure A.3 presents several counterfactual election re-
sults by which to judge the impact of strategic voting.34 The top left panel shows the actual
distribution of seats in the Bundestag, whereas the panel on the right displays the distribu-
tion that would prevail if mandates were awarded based solely on a single vote counted under
proportionality rule with a 5%-threshold, i.e. the list vote. Evidently, the current Bundestag
mirrors a parliament formed under proportional representation fairly closely: all ve major
parties are represented, with more than 60% of seats accruing to the CDU and the SPD. In
the current equilibrium, distortions introduced through strategic candidate votes are very
small.
The remaining two panels assume a single vote counted under plurality rule on the district
level (akin to the candidate vote, or elections to the House of Representatives in the U.S.)
The counterfactual on the bottom left shows the model's predictions for such a rst-past-
the-post scheme with 26:3% of voters behaving instrumentally rational and the current set
of candidates. In the panel on the bottom right all voters choose sincerely (between party's
current candidates).
In line with common intuition, relative to proportional representation a \winner-take-all"
system would result in dramatic losses for small parties. However, as comparing the panels
on the right shows, these losses are due to the way dierent electoral rules map vote shares
into mandates and not to instrumentally rational behavior.
The impact of strategic behavior can be gleaned from comparing the two counterfactuals on
the bottom. Given its estimated extent, tactical voting has only a modest eect on the overall
allocation of seats. Not a single party's share of seats would change by more than 5 percentage
points, often substantially less. Yet, looking only at seat totals misses an important point.
The evidence in Table A.6 indicates that, compared to the current equilibrium, about one
in ten districts would change hands if all voters were to cast sincere ballots.
E. Numerical Methods
This appendix describes the numerical methods used to solve the optimization problem
dened by equations (9){(12) as well as the construction of counterfactual election results
in Appendix D.2.
E.1. Mathematical Programming with Equality Constraints
Typically, to recover mean utilities in models of discrete choice (i.e. p;m) researchers turn to
inverting the system of non-linear markets share equations via the nested xed point (NFP)
algorithm in Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995). Recently, however, Su and Judd (2012)
34For details on the computation of these counterfactuals see Appendix E.
and Dube et al. (2012) have shown how to recast extremum estimators in general, and the
one in the Berry et al. (1995) in particular, as a mathematical programming problem with
equality constraints (MPEC).
Key to the MPEC approach is the insight that the inner loop can be eliminated entirely by
recasting the estimator as an optimization problem subject to a set of non-linear constraints,
i.e. (10), which require predicted market shares to equal observed ones.
Since objective function and market share equations are usually smooth, one can rely on
state-of-art optimization software to nd candidate solutions. Moreover, dispensing with the
inner loops avoids numerical problems associated with loose inner loop error tolerances (see
Dube et al. 2012 for a discussion of the NFP algorithm's numerical properties), and it may
signicantly increase computational speed because the system of market share equations
does not have to be solved exactly at each iteration. (The constraints have to be satised
only at the solution.) Importantly, Su and Judd (2012) prove that MPEC and NFP solve
the same problem, yielding the same estimates with the same statistical properties.
The implementation of MPEC in this paper is based on the MATLAB code of Dube et al.
(2012), using both of the KNITRO solver's interior-point and active set algorithms (Byrd et
al. 1999, 2004, 2006). To improve numerical accuracy as well as computational performance,
KNITRO is provided with hand-coded rst-order analytical derivatives of the objective func-
tion and the constraints, second order derivatives, as well as the sparsity patterns of the
constraint Jacobian and the Hessian. Since the Hessian contains almost 4 109 elements of
which only about 1:8  106 are non-zero, supplying the solver with the sparsity pattern is
critical in order to economize on memory usage and time. To increase the likelihood of nding
the global optimum ve dierent starting points are used. Relative optimality and feasibility
error tolerances, i.e. the maximum violation of the rst order conditions and the constraints,
have each been set to 10 6. Reported standard errors are based on the block-bootstrap with
100 iterations.
In order to provide the solver with a completely smooth optimization problem, the con-
straints in (11){(12) have been rewritten as an indicator function for each candidate, ck (),















for  = 5,000. Thus, equation (8) becomes
bvC;Tk;m = Z ck exp (p;m + i;p + k)1 +Pk02K ck exp (p0;m + i;p0 + k0)d () :
E.2. Sparse Grid Integration
Instead of solving the approximately 120,000 ve dimensional integrals in equations (6), (7),
and (8) using simulation methods, the present paper relies on sparse grid integration (SGI),
introduced into economics by Heiss and Winschel (2008). SGI provides a way to approxi-
mate integrals numerically avoiding the curse of dimensionality associated with conventional
quadrature rules (see Judd 1998). Monte Carlo evidence by Skrainka and Judd (2011) indi-
cates that SGI imposes a signicantly lower computational burden than simulation methods
achieving the same level of accuracy.
SGI is closely related to conventional Gaussian quadrature rules, but by exploiting symme-
try properties it relies only on a small subset of nodes and (appropriately rescaled) weights.
This paper uses a Konrad-Patterson rule with Gaussian kernel for choosing nodes, as ex-
plained in Heiss and Winschel (2008). This particular rule has only 151 nodes; yet it exactly
integrates (over ve dimensions) all complete polynomials of total order less than 7. Ex-
perimentation with more accurate rules yielded essentially the same point estimates, but
required signicantly more CPU time.
E.3. Construction of Counterfactuals
The counterfactual election results in Section D.2 of the Appendix have been constructed by
simulation. More specically, for each municipality in the data 100 times its actual number of
voters have been simulated by randomly drawing , , and " from the respective (estimated)
distributions. A fraction  of simulated voters (rounded to the nearest integer) are designated
to behave sincerely. Next, each voter's candidate and party specic utilities are calculated
and his (partial) preference orderings for the list and candidate vote are determined. Natu-
rally, sincere voters consider all candidates, whereas tactical voters choose only among those
contestants who are estimated to be contenders. Election results are then constructed by
aggregating votes to the appropriate level, and applying the specied electoral rule.
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, where denotes the vote share of 
candidate k  in precinct r  during election year t ,           is the list vote share of the assicoated party, and is a municipality
and year specific candidate fixed effect. f(∙) is approximated by cubic B-splines with knots at every 1.5 percentage points. 
Standard errors account for clustering at the state level and have been calculated using the nonparametric bootstrap with 1,000
iterations.
Figure 1: Relationship between List and Candidate Votes for Candidates Trailing Far Behind
Notes: Figure shows a semiparametric estimate of the relationship between list and candidate votes for candidates of the five 
major parties who trail the runner-up in their district by more than 10 percentage points as well as the associated asymptotic  
95%-confidence intervals. The estimating equation is 𝑣𝑘,𝑟,𝑡







Figure 2: Difference in Incidence of Behavioral Voting between East and West Germany, 1990–2009
Notes:  Figure shows the percentage point difference in the incidence of behavioral voting between East and West Germany for each 
federal election from 1990 to 2009 as well as the associated 95%-confidence intervals. Negative values indicate more ballot 
combinations that violate instrumental rationality among residents of the former GDR. The null hypothesis of a constant difference 









1990 1994 1998 2002 2005 2009
Number of Share of Share of
Party Direct Mandates Candidate Vote List Vote CDU/CSU SPD The Left Green Party FDP Others Invalid
CDU/CSU 218 38.7% 33.3% .876 .042 .007 .017 .048 .005 .006
SPD 64 27.5% 22.7% .045 .858 .024 .052 .011 .004 .006
The Left 16 10.9% 11.7% .031 .128 .757 .048 .017 .014 .005
Green Party 1 9.0% 10.6% .061 .333 .036 .536 .021 .008 .004
FDP 0 9.3% 14.4% .458 .048 .011 .021 .448 .009 .005
Others 0 2.9% 5.9% .133 .130 .114 .125 .090 .378 .030
Invalid -- 1.7% 1.4% .117 .079 .025 .013 .021 .013 .732
Source:  Author's calculations based on Bundeswahlleiter (2009a, 2010).
Variable Full Sample CDU/CSU SPD FDP The Left Green Party Others
Age 47.16 49.14 48.87 44.96 49.29 44.01 46.94
(11.97) (9.72) (9.83) (11.29) (10.48) (10.97) (14.45)
Female .226 .191 .353 .169 .259 .344 .139
(.418) (.393) (.478) (.375) (.438) (.475) (.346)
Doctorate .109 .204 .134 .161 .090 .105 .041
(.312) (.403) (.341) (.367) (.287) (.306) (.199)
Currently Member of Parliament .231 .652 .602 .161 .083 .148 .002
(.422) (.477) (.490) (.367) (.277) (.356) (.039)
Holds Direct Mandate .111 .376 .403 .000 .009 .003 .001
(.315) (.485) (.491) (.000) (.092) (.058) (.028)
Also on Party List .626 .759 .950 .888 .434 .546 .414
(.484) (.428) (.218) (.316) (.496) (.498) (.493)
Position on Party List | Also List Candidate 12.89 13.26 17.36 17.47 9.40 8.89 7.32
(12.86) (12.79) (15.46) (15.32) (8.19) (6.94) (7.02)
4,257 598 598 598 587 593 1,283
Notes:  Entries are means and standard deviations of characteristics of direct candidates running in the 2005 or 2009 federal elections, by party affiliation. See 
the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Table 1: Distribution of List and Candidate Votes in the 2009 Federal Election
Candidate Vote as Fraction of Party's List Vote
Notes:  Entries denote each party's number of direct mandates, share of list and candidate votes, as well as the frequency of different list and candidate vote combinations 
(calculated as a fraction of a party's list vote) in the 2009 federal election. Due to rounding, entries may not add up to unity.
Table 2A: Characteristics of Direct Candidates
Party Affiliation
Variable Full Sample 2005 2009 2005 2009
Number of Eligible Voters 820.7 821.5 834.2 782.9 802.5
(406.1) (385.4) (387.6) (460.3) (487.7)
Turnout .747 .789 .727 .751 .658
(.087) (.071) (.083) (.069) (.084)
Share of Candidate Vote (in %):
CDU/CSU 41.07 44.81 41.94 29.65 32.94
(13.02) (13.33) (11.49) (9.93) (10.32)
SPD 32.23 38.73 28.80 31.35 20.03
(12.61) (12.66) (10.71) (8.28) (7.54)
FDP 7.04 4.59 9.66 5.16 8.17
(3.93) (2.25) (3.74) (2.85) (3.73)
The Left 9.66 3.95 7.35 24.86 28.61
(9.67) (3.06) (4.01) (7.37) (8.46)
Green Party 6.87 5.46 9.32 3.76 5.53
(5.29) (3.78) (5.23) (5.80) (6.08)
Others 3.08 2.38 2.88 5.22 4.72
(2.88) (2.75) (2.59) (3.10) (2.70)
Share of List Vote (in %):
CDU/CSU 35.47 38.67 35.59 26.21 30.65
(11.60) (12.48) (10.25) (8.59) (8.92)
SPD 27.98 34.22 23.62 29.96 17.95
(10.91) (10.84) (8.63) (7.16) (5.94)
FDP 12.01 10.10 15.18 8.00 10.57
(4.83) (3.56) (4.61) (3.25) (3.76)
The Left 10.43 4.83 8.40 25.05 28.27
(9.23) (3.09) (4.26) (6.26) (7.56)
Green Party 8.83 8.38 10.93 4.78 5.90
(5.38) (4.87) (5.25) (4.13) (4.93)
Others 5.23 3.71 6.23 6.01 6.66
(2.85) (2.03) (2.76) (3.03) (3.03)
Absentee Precinct .148 .155 .166 .090 .098
(.355) (.362) (.372) (.286) (.297)
Number of Observations 177,425 71,614 72,056 17,110 16,645
Table 2B: Summary Statistics for Electoral Precincts
Notes:  Entries are means and standard deviations for all precinct-level variables used in the analysis, differentiating 
between East and West Germany as well as election year. See the Data Appendix for a precise definition of each 
variable.
West Germany East Germany
A. All Voters
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote  (φ) 1.205 1.018 .936 .937 .891
(.022) (.012) (.007) (.008) (.014)
Constant -3.440
(.430)
H0: φ=1 [p -value] < .001 .165 < .001 < .001 < .001
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .936 .961 .979 .980 .987
Number of Observations 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061
B. Voters with No Strategic Incetives to Cast Split Ballots
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote  (φ) 1.078 1.061 1.001 1.021 .989
(.010) (.010) (.009) (.011) (.018)
Constant 2.394
(.573)
H0: φ=1 [p -value] < .001 < .001 .933 .064 .544
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .895 .903 .946 .950 .968
Number of Observations 354,462 354,462 354,462 354,462 354,462
C. Voters with Strategic Incentives to Cast Split Ballots
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote  (φ) .795 .798 .730 .695 .663
(.065) (.026) (.023) (.029) (.029)
Constant -.476
(.471)
H0: φ=1 [p -value] .024 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .712 .813 .888 .897 .934
Number of Observations 527,419 527,419 527,419 527,419 527,419
Table 3: Testing the Null Hypothesis of Sincere Voting
Share of Candidate Vote
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation (1) by ordinary least 
squares.  The upper panel restricts the sample to all candidates of Germany's five major parties. The 
middle panel considers only candidates who finsihed first or runner-up, giving supporters of the 
associated parties no strategic incentives to cast split ballots. The lower panel restricts attention to 
candidates who finished third or worse, meaning that at least some supporters of the associated parties 
had a strategic incentive to cast split ballots. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by 
state and reported in parentheses. To account for the small number of clusters, reported p -values are 
based on the wild bootstrap procedure suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) with 10,000 iterations. See the 
Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Share of Candidate Vote
Share of Candidate Vote
Rank Based on
Candidate Vote 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 557 38 3 0 0 0
2 39 502 54 3 0 0
3 2 44 369 139 39 5
4 0 14 131 306 138 9
5 0 0 39 139 332 87
6 0 0 2 11 88 474
Total 598 598 598 598 597 575
First or Runner-Up 99.7% 90.3% 9.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0%
Notes:  Entries denote the number of candidates for each combination of own rank based on received 
candidate votes (left column) and the within-district ranking of the associated party based on the list 
vote in the same year (top row). For instance, out of the 598 candidates whose party received the most 
list votes within a particular district, 557 won the direct mandate for that district, 39 candidates finished 
in second place, and 2 ended up third. The rank order correlation within districts is .93.
Table 4: Ranking of Candidates in the 2005 & 2009 Federal Elections
Rank Based on List Vote
A. Candidates Trailing Far Behind
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote (λ) .621 .682 .670 .632 .613
(.027) (.013) (.010) (.014) (.016)
Constant .676
(.193)
H0: λ=1 [p -value] < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
H0: λ=0 [p -value] < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .622 .717 .816 .832 .885
Number of Observations 463,544 463,544 463,544 463,544 463,544
B. All Candidates
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote .819 .765 .696 .657 .656
× Noncontender  (λ) (.063) (.022) (.021) (.019) (.026)
Share of List Vote 1.118 1.060 .982 1.004 .978
× Contender  (γ) (.016) (.010) (.010) (.012) (.021)
Noncontender -.596 3.664 -3.887
(.441) (.433) (.614)
Contender .649 6.477 -.742
(.767) (.717) (.140)
Structural Break .009 .021 .065 .064 .023
H0: λ=1 [p -value] .027 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
H0: λ=0 [p -value] < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .951 .965 .980 .982 .989
Number of Observations 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating equation (3) (upper panel) and 
equation (4) (lower panel) by ordinary least squares. The upper panel restricts the sample to candidates 
who finished more than 10 percentage points behind second place, whereas the lower panel includes all 
candidates. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. 
To account for the small number of clusters, reported p -values are based on the wild bootstrap procedure 
suggested by Cameron et al. (2008) with 10,000 iterations. See the Data Appendix for the precise 
definition and source of each variable.
Table 5: Quantifying Deviations from Instrumental Rationality
Share of Candidate Vote
Share of Candidate Vote
Fixed Effects: Candidate × 
Restriction Candidate × Year Municipality × Year 
Baseline .657 .656
(.019) (.026)
By Availability of Close Substitute:
Allied Party's Candidate in the Race .586 .556
(.024) (.024)
Only Rival Parties' Candidates in the Race .829 .817
(.012) (.014)
By Difference Between Winner and Runner-Up:
< 1% .618 .606
(.043) (.034)
1% and 5% .644 .621
(.026) (.028)










Based on Preferences 1.003 .965
(.024) (.017)
Based on Ex Post Outcome 1.018 .965
(.018) (.017)
By Distance between First- and Second-Ranked
Candidate, based on Preferences:
< 2% 1.008 .992
(.017) (.020)
2% to 5% .988 .962
(.017) (.017)
5% to 10% 1.032 .955
(.019) (.018)
10% to 15% .996 .934
(.035) (.020)
> 15% .992 .926
(.044) (.023)
By Distance between First- and Second-Ranked
Candidate, based on Ex Post Outcome:
< 2% 1.003 .987
(.018) (.015)
2% to 5% 1.021 .963
(.014) (.018)
5% to 10% 1.032 .959
(.018) (.018)
10% to 15% 1.036 .949
(.025) (.020)
> 15% 1.004 .943
(.025) (.024)
Table 7:  Candidate–List Vote Gradient among First- and Second-Ranked Candidates
Slope
Notes:  Entries denote the candidate–list vote gradient for first- and second-ranked candidates, i.e. 
φ in equation (1), by distance between the them. The respective cutoffs are shown in the column on 
the left. All estimates control for candidate-municipality-year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses.
Table 6:  Comparative Statics
Share of Behavioral Voters
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on  λ  estimated from equation (4), using 
different subsamples of the data. The respective restriction is indicated on the left of each row. See 
the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Fixed Effects: Candidate × 
Classification of Contenders Candidate × Year Municipality × Year 
Baseline (Preference Based, Original Cutoff) .657 .656
(.019) (.026)
Ex Post Outcome of Races (Original Cutoff) .655 .651
(.018) (.026)
Preference Based Using Different Cutoffs:
> 1% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .705 .668
(.029) (.028)
> 2% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .693 .661
(.027) (.027)
> 5% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .669 .641
(.021) (.020)
> 8% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .648 .623
(.017) (.018)
> 10% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .634 .609
(.015) (.014)
> 12% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .615 .589
(.012) (.009)
Ex Post Outcome of Races Using Different Cutoffs:
> 1% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .690 .658
(.027) (.028)
> 2% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .682 .652
(.026) (.026)
> 5% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .663 .635
(.020) (.021)
> 8% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .650 .626
(.018) (.020)
> 10% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .632 .613
(.014) (.016)
> 12% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .618 .597
(.011) (.011)
Ranked First or Second Based on Preferences .716 .676
(.030) (.030)
Ranked First, Second, or Third Based on Preferences .701 .665
(.023) (.017)
Ranked First or Second Based on Ex Post Outcome .695 .663
(.029) (.029)
Ranked First, Second, or Third Based on Ex Post Outcome .629 .600
(.013) (.014)
Finished First or Second in Last Federal Election .713 .678
(.032) (.034)
Finished First, Second, or Third in Last Federal Election .681 .643
(.015) (.011)
Finish in Last Federal Election (Original Cutoff) .684 .670
(.026) (.031)
Finish in Last Federal Election Using Different Cutoffs:
> 1% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .709 .674
(.031) (.032)
> 2% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .704 .670
(.030) (.032)
> 5% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .687 .656
(.027) (.029)
> 8% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .678 .648
(.024) (.027)
> 10% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .671 .642
(.022) (.023)
> 12% behind Second-Ranked Candidate .663 .634
(.019) (.019)
Table 8:  Sensitivity Analysis Using Alternative Classifications of Contenders 
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on λ using alternative classifications of "contender." The 
respective definition is shown in the column on the left. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
clustered by state and reported in parentheses.
Share of Sincere Votes
Fixed Effects: Candidate × 
Restriction Candidate × Year Municipality × Year 
Baseline .657 .656
(.019) (.026)
Difference Estimator .653 .678
(.027) (.038)
In States without Overhang Mandates .624 .609
(.029) (.031)
Weighted by Number of Party Supporters .678 .672
(.029) (.037)
Including "Other" Party Candidates .659 .645
(.020) (.025)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote 1.008 1.008 1.008 1.008 1.008
× Contender (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
Share of List Vote .666 .644 .664 .605 .679
× Noncontender (.031) (.029) (.030) (.033) (.022)
Share of List Vote -.005
× Noncontender × Population Density (.007)
Share of List Vote .019
× Noncontender × Fraction of Voters Female (.023)
Share of List Vote -.271
× Noncontender × Income Tax Revenue per Capita (.078)
Share of List Vote .244
× Noncontender × Fraction of Voters under Age 30 (.074)
Candidate × Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared .984 .984 .984 .984 .984
Number of Observations 120,700 120,700 120,700 120,700 120,700
Table 9:  Additional Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
Share of Behavioral Voters
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on the share of behavioral voters, 
i.e. λ,  using different subsamples of the data and weighting schemes. The respective 
restriction is indicated on the left of each row. See the Data Appendix for the precise 
definition and source of each variable.
Table 10: Correlates of Sincere Voting
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from estimating specifications analogous to equation (4) by ordinary least squares, with a structural break at κ=.064. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses. For ease of interpretation, covariates interacted with Share of List Vote × 
Noncontender have been demeaned.  In addition to the variables shown in the table, indicator variables for missing values on each covariate are also included in the 
regressions. See the Data Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
Share of Candidate Vote
Figure A.1: Distribution of Direct Mandates in the 2005 and 2009 Federal Elections
Notes:  Figure depicts majority of the candidate vote by electoral district and candidates' party affiliation in the 2005 (left) and 2009 (right) federal elections. In the 2005 (2009) election, candidates running 
for the CDU/CSU won the plurality of  votes in 150 (218) out of 299 electoral districts. SPD candidates gained 145 (64) direct mandates. Candidates of the The Left won 3 (16) districts, and the Green Party 
achieved 1 (1) direct mandate. No FDP contestant won a district race.
B. 2009A. 2005
Sources: Based on Bundeswahlleiter (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009a).
Figure A.2: Observed vs Predicted Distribution of Votes based on Structural Analysis, 2009 Federal Elections
A. Marginal Distribution of Candidate Votes
B. Marginal Distribution of List Votes
C. Joint Distribution of Candidate and List Votes
Notes:  Figure depicts actual and predicted vote shares in the 2009 federal election. Panel A shows the marginal distribution of candidate votes, and panel B that of list votes. Panel C 
depicts the frequency of valid list and candidate vote combinations, i.e. their joint distribution. Dark columns are based on official statistics by the Federal Returning Officer 















































































































Figure A.3: Counterfactual Seat Distributions in the 17th Bundestag 
Notes:  Figure depicts counterfactual seat distributions in the Bundestag following the 2009 federal election. 
Results are based on the structural estimation in Appendix D. See the appendix for a description of the 












































Sincere and Strategic Voters
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of List Vote 1.023 1.004 .983 .998 .965
× Ranked First (.024) (.019) (.008) (.011) (.017)
Share of List Vote 1.141 1.062 1.011 1.037 1.003
× Ranked Second (.019) (.012) (.017) (.015) (.024)
Share of List Vote  1.066 .852 .780 .730 .686
× Ranked Third (.075) (.053) (.045) (.053) (.055)
Share of List Vote .707 .711 .691 .653 .601
× Ranked Fourth (.026) (.026) (.030) (.031) (.026)
Share of List Vote .809 .846 .795 .782 .767
× Ranked Fifth (.018) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014)
Share of List Vote .817 .823 .787 .765 .740
× Ranked Sixth (.044) (.042) (.014) (.047) (.049)
Fixed Effects:
Party No Yes No No No
Candidate No No Yes No No
Candidate × Year No No No Yes No
Candidate × Municipality × Year No No No No Yes
R-Squared .953 .965 .980 .982 .989
Number of Observations 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061 882,061
Table A.1:  Candidate-List-Vote Gradient, by Preference-Based Rank
Share of Candidate Vote
Notes: Entries are coefficients and standard errors from regressing the variables shown on the left on a 
candidate's vote share. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in 
parentheses. Columns (1)–(3) also include indicator variables for candidates' rank. See the Data 
Appendix for the precise definition and source of each variable.
A. National Level
Election Year CDU SPD FDP The Left Green Party CSU
2005 .919 .170 .184 .208 .524 .996
2009 .517 .557 .655 .636 .115 .519
Hₒ: Fractional Mandates ~ U[0,1]
All Years:  p -value = .721
2005:  p -value = .542
2009:  p -value = .310
B. State Level
State & Election Year CDU SPD FDP The Left Green Party CSU
Bavaria, 2005 -- .761 .843 .209 .440 .996
Bavaria, 2009 -- .480 .377 .329 .534 .519
Baden-Württemberg, 2005 .066 .080 .106 .873 .279 --
Baden-Württemberg, 2009 .416 .467 .062 .743 .066 --
Brandenburg, 2005 .246 .388 .414 .460 .066 --
Brandenburg, 2009 .789 .124 .909 .831 .238 --
Berlin, 2005 .382 .387 .997 .981 .382 --
Berlin, 2009 .751 .122 .923 .139 .387 --
Bremen, 2005 .085 .043 .385 .401 .686 --
Bremen, 2009 .184 .507 .530 .713 .766 --
Hamburg, 2005 .588 .808 .110 .780 .870 --
Hamburg, 2009 .608 .575 .725 .461 .028 --
Hesse, 2005 .901 .754 .146 .346 .521 --
Hesse, 2009 .960 .958 .766 .001 .594 --
Lower Saxony, 2005 .070 .070 .595 .691 .715 --
Lower Saxony, 2009 .523 .098 .664 .713 .967 --
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, 2005 .863 .141 .814 .078 .523 --
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, 2009 .205 .113 .255 .708 .701 --
North Rhine-Westphalia, 2005 .413 .874 .451 .949 .398 --
North Rhine-Westphalia, 2009 .508 .418 .534 .642 .852 --
Rhineland-Palatinate, 2005 .558 .812 .661 .733 .297 --
Rhineland-Palatinate, 2009 .225 .666 .370 .024 .104 --
Saarland, 2005 .516 .778 .619 .535 .498 --
Saarland, 2009 .622 .126 .022 .826 .579 --
Saxony, 2005 .474 .547 .538 .918 .685 --
Saxony, 2009 .714 .837 .405 .129 .216 --
Saxony-Anhalt, 2005 .710 .246 .537 .054 .786 --
Saxony-Anhalt, 2009 .299 .985 .829 .741 .904 --
Schleswig-Holstein, 2005 .224 .620 .275 .033 .923 --
Schleswig-Holstein, 2009 .583 .338 .854 .875 .984 --
Thuringia, 2005 .905 .692 .509 .961 .930 --
Thuringia, 2009 .613 .187 .776 .231 .081 --
Hₒ: Fractional Mandates ~ U[0,1]
All Years:  p -value = .362
2005:  p -value = .271
2009:  p -value = .798
Table A.2: Initial Distribution of Fractional Mandates by Party, 2005 & 2009 Federal Elections
Fractional Mandates
Notes:  Entries denote the number of fractional mandates by party in the 2005 and 2009 federal elections, as explained 
in Appendix B. The upper panel does so for the national level, whereas the lower panel refers to the state level. Hₒ 
refers to the null hypothesis that the number of fractional mandates is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. The 
respective p -values are based on Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. For a detailed description of how mandates are allocated 
to parties, see Appendix B.
Fractional Mandates
Candidate × 







< 30 .586 .582
(.021) (.034)
30 to 50 .636 .642
(.020) (.030)
50 to 70 .709 .698
(.023) (.026)
> 70 .730 .723
(.024) (.027)
By Education:
Doctoral Degree .579 .580
(.030) (.044)
No Doctoral Degree .666 .665
(.018) (.025)
By Membership in Parliament:
Currently in Parliament .744 .731
(.046) (.050)
Not Currently in Parliament .636 .635
(.014) (.020)
By List Candidate Status:
Also on Party List .632 .636
(.026) (.035)
Not on Party List .708 .702
(.013) (.014)
Table A.3:  Estimated Share of Behavioral Voters by Candiate Characteristics
Share of Behavioral Voters
Notes:  Entries are coefficients and standard errors on the share of behavioral 
voters, i.e. λ,  using different subsamples of candidates. The respective restriction 
is indicated on the left of each row. See the Data Appendix for the precise 
definition and source of each variable.
Actual Rank 1 2 3 4 5
1 94.6% 5.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0%
2 5.1% 91.8% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0%
3 0.3% 3.1% 88.1% 7.5% 1.0%
4 0.0% 0.0% 8.2% 86.1% 5.8%
5 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 6.5% 93.2%
First-Choice
Candidate CDU/CSU SPD FDP The Left Green Party
CDU/CSU -- 26.8% 50.0% 8.1% 15.1%
SPD 16.1% -- 0.3% 15.5% 68.0%
FDP 98.9% 0.6% -- 0.1% 0.4%
The Left 18.0% 60.4% 0.1% -- 21.5%
Green Party 14.5% 77.1% 0.4% 8.1% --
District Winner
with Sincere Voters CDU/CSU SPD FDP The Left Green Party
CDU/CSU 70.8% 1.7% 0.0% 1.0% 0.3%
SPD 6.5% 16.7% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0%
FDP 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
The Left 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0%
Green Party 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
Table A.6: Joint Distribution of District Winners under Sincere and Strategic Voting, Structural Analysis
District Winner with Sincere and Strategic Voters
Notes:  Entries compare the simulated distribution of district winners in a first-past-the-post system with 
only sincere voters (left column) to the distribution that would obtain with a mixture of types (top row). 
Summing across columns gives the percentage of districts that would acrue to a particular party if all 
voters behaved sincerely, whereas summing across rows gives a party's share of districts if 26.3% of voters 
behaved strategically. Consequently, adding the entries on the diagonal shows that about 90% of districts 
would accrue to the same party. See Appendix E for details on the simulation.
Table A.4: Actual vs Predicted Ranking of Candidates, Structural Analysis of 2009 Federal Elections
Predicted Rank (as Fraction of Actual Rank)
Notes:  Entries denote the frequency with which the predictions of the structural model in Appendix D 
coincide with observed outcomes, considering only candidates of the 5 major parties.
Table A.5: Voters' Partial Preference Orderings
Second-Choice Candidate (as Fraction of First Choice)
Notes:  Entries denote the simulated relative frequency of voters' second-choice candidate, conditional on 
their first choice. See Appendices D and E for details.
